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NOTES
AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: A RE-EXAMINATION
Julia, ,whispering "I will ne'er consent"-consented.
Justice Jackson reproduced this hexameter from Byron's Don Juan
in his dissent to Everson v. Board of Education.1 In Everson the Court
declared that the religion clauses of the first amendment2 forbade all
government aid to religion, and simultaneously approved a statute which
allowed New Jersey to finance the busing of parochial school children.
The Justice was unable to understand how the "no aid" prohibition
could be reconciled with bus financing.
The brevity of the first amendment and the paucity of interpretive
case law has precipitated a dispute concerning the meaning of the reli-
gion clauses. Prominent commentators have espoused various theories
concerning the constitutionality of government aid to religion-particu-
larly programs benefitting church related schools. When applied to
the same aid program, these theories often yield different results; some
would sustain the same program which others would strike down.
This Note has a threefold purpose. Initially, it will examine the most
important of these theories. Secondly, it will review four recent Su-
preme Court cases which have formulated the doctrine of excessive
entanglement. Finally, it will analyze the impact of this doctrine upon
the previously espoused theories in order to assess their continuing
vitality.3
THE THEORIES
The Absolutes
A. Aid Is Forbidden
There are two absolute positions. The first, the strict separation the-
ory,4 holds simply that government cannot advance religion in any
1. 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1946) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. This Note will not examine the effect of state constitutional provisions upon pa-
rochiaid legislation.
4. This theory is alternatively named the "no aid" or the "separation" theory. The
phrase "separation of church and state" is not written in the Constitution. Its first ap-
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manner.- Adherents to this view, which has never gained the support of
the majority of the Supreme Court,' rely upon Justice Black's celebrated
dictum in Everson.7 This was employed by Justice Rutledge, who also
dissented in Everson. Justice Rutledge asserted that the first amendment
prohibits any public funds from being used to assist religious activities.8
To support his conclusion he examined the zeitgeist which led to the
amendment's enactment. James Madison, in 1785, published his famed
Memorial and Remonstrance,9 which attacked "all forms of 'establish-
ment of religion.'" 10 Madison and Jefferson"' sought to convince their
countrymen that religious liberty is best achieved and preserved by
complete segregation of the provinces of church and state.12 Their suc-
cess in this endeavor was first measured by an enactment of the Virginia
pearance in American history was in an 1801 letter by Thomas Jefferson to a Baptist
association in Danbury, Connecticut. Mr. Jefferson, in an almost offhand response
to a flattering address by the association, remarked that it was his opinion that the first
amendment built a "wall of separation between church and State." Sutherland, Due
Process and Disestablishment, 62 H.uv. L. Rav. 1306, 1310 (1949). The Supreme Court
first used the phrase in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
5. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (Rutledge, J, dissenting).
If the "no aid" position is followed to its logical extremity, then government is prohibited
from providing normal social services to churches. Therefore, this theory disallows
public police and fire protection, public sidewalks, and other general welfare benefits.
Some separationists hold that parochial schools themselves are not constitutionally re-
quired even though Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), invalidated an
Oregon statute requiring all students to attend public schools. Hays, Law and the
Parochial School: A Formulation of Conflicting Opinions, 3 CATHOLIC LAW. 99 (1957).
The extreme position-that general welfare benefits are prohibited-is tenuous because
it denies public benefits on the grounds of religion and therefore conflicts with the free
exercise clause. Few absolutists are willing to carry their doctrine to its logical con-
clusion. See, e.g., L. PFrasR, Cmnucz, STATE "D FasanoM 477 (1953) where educa-
tional benefits are distinguished from true welfare benefits.
6. Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but
for the Grace of God, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 79, 91 (1966). Justice Douglas takes this
position. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 399, 410 (1963) (concurring opinion).
7. "Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions . . . whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice re-
ligion. . . " 330 U.S. at 15-16. This statement was reaffirmed in Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). McCollum, however, has been severely
limited by Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
8. 330 U.S. at 41.
9. Id. at 63. Justice Rutledge includes the text in an appendix to his dissenting opinion.
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 31.
12. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 554-62. (3d
series 1946).
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General Assembly declaring, "[t]hat no man shall be compelled ...
to support any religious . . . [activity]." 13 Justice Rutledge traces
the influence of these ideas through the constitutional convention and
its aftermath, which witnessed the ratification of the Constitution and
the amendments, and concludes that the founders sought absolutely to
bar government aid to religion.14
This view gains some support from a literal reading of the first amend-
ment. Justice Douglas, dissenting in McGowan v. Maryland,5 which
upheld a state law 6 prohibiting the sale of certain goods on Sunday,
argues that the imposition of criminal sanctions upon such sellers con-
stitutes an impermissible establishment of religion. He rests his argu-
ment for absolute separation upon the force of the words of the amend-
ment: "no law" means no law.' 7 Government may not, on the basis
of a majority of its citizens' feelings, impose upon the minority a law
which regulates their economic activities on Sunday. The reasoning is
13. 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 86 (1785).
14. 330 U.S. at 33-41. For other examinations of the history of the amendment see,
e.g., Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedolm, 14 LAw & CoN-
TEMp. PRoB. 44, 51-56 (1949); Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress, and The
Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1396, 1404-27 (1966); Sutherland,
supra note 4; Comment, The Supreme Court, The First Amendment, and Religion in
the Public Schools, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 77-83 (1963). Even a cursory reading of
these sources reveals that the commentators are sharply divided in their understanding
of the historical meaning of the first amendment. Supporters of the various theories of
"aid" or "no aid" seek to justify their opinions by reference to the founding fathers.
The resulting confusion leads some scholars to conclude that the amendment's history is
irrelevant. See, e.g., Konvitz, supra.
15. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521 (1957).
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, stated that neither the present purpose
nor the primary effect of Sunday closing laws promotes religion. It is of no moment that
such laws may once have been designed to further religious ends; today, they do no
more than provide a regular day of leisure for American citizens. 366 U.S. at 445-49.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion suggests a qualification to the "secular purpose
and primary effect" test in that a statute which incidentally aids religion-such as a
Sunday closing law-is permissible only if the state cannot reasonably employ an al-
ternative method to achieve the secular goal-a day of rest. Id. at 462. Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), illustrates the "alternative means" test. The Court in-
validated a state requirement that an officeholder swear a belief in God, because the secu-
lar goal-good public officials-could be achieved by other means which would not also
advance religion. For cases similar to McGowan see Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961).
17. 366 U.S. at 575. "Congress shall make no law.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. (emphasis
supplied).
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that such a result could be brought about only through a law-but all
"laws" are prohibited.i
Apart from the disputed history and the literal meaning of the estab-
lishment clause, the supporters of "no aid" advance two other bases
for their position. First, the free exercise clause prohibits aid to religion.
If government taxes one segment of society for the benefit of another's
religious institutions, then those who have been taxed are denied the
free exercise of religion because their money is used to sustain religious
views to which they do not subscribe.'9 Furthermore, the tax support
may adversely affect such a taxpayer's financial ability to convince the
public of the allegedly erroneous religious position of the benefited
group.20 Secondly, concomitant with government aid are government
controls which would threaten the independence of the religious insti-
tution. The legislature cannot give money away without placing re-
strictions on its use, and such restrictions would restrain the free exercise
of the institution receiving the funds. To avoid this result government
must be prohibited from granting aid."
18. 366 US. at 575.
19. Opponents of this position counter by arguing that aid which supports the public
good is not a denial of free exercise. Thus, police and fire protection, which advance
the general public welfare, does not deny free exercise rights when provided for
churches.
In some limited circumstances the state may even directly finance religious activities.
See, e.g., Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). Contra, Gellhorn & Greenawalt,
Public Support and the Sectarian University, 38 FoRHAx L. REV. 395, 408 (1970). See
also Dunn v. Chicago Indus. School for Girls, 280 IMI. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917); Reich-
wald v. Catholic Bishop, 258 IM. 44, 101 N.E. 266 (1913). In both cases, the state con-
stitution was held not to prohibit government from providing financial support for the
religious education of prison inmates or juveniles committed to a state institution. For
a discussion of these cases and the impact of the free exercise clause upon the applicability
of establishment principles see Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U.
Cn. L. REv. 426,429-31 (1953).
20. An argument may be advanced that this also constitutes a denial of free speech.
See Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religious Guarantees, 80 YALE LJ.
77, 90-91 (1970).
21. Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 407. See also Schwarz, No Imposition
of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YAMn LJ. 692, 710 (1968). Professor
Schwarz argues that "no aid" is faulty because non-preferential assistance has been given
throughout the history of the United States. The "no aid" argument is also mistaken
because those controls which government attaches to aid may be rejected. If the control
debilitates a group's religious freedom to the extent that it is unpalatable, then the
parochial school may decline to accept the aid.
Opponents of aid present a broad array of cogent arguments against aid which are
properly characterized as those belonging to the province of legislative discretion. These
arguments, although they may be sound, are only incidentally presented in this Note. For
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Applying this reasoning, "no aid" theorists would deny government
the opportunity to assist parochial schools on the ground that such school
aid implicitly benefits the particular religion which supports the school.
This view posits that all teaching in a parochial school is so inextricably
intertwined with religious values that any aid, even something as appar-
ently secular as a grant for a physics laboratory, amounts to the estab-
lishment of religion. A leading proponent of this position, Professor
Konvitz, examines the educational philosophy of the Roman Catholic
schools to support this argument. He concludes that Roman Catholic
doctrine does not "recognize any distinction between secular and reli-
gious teaching . ,, 2 There are two flaws in this position. First,
Catholics could change their view and recognize a distinction between
the secular and the religious functions of parochial schools. Secondly,
other religious groups which maintain this distinction should not be
penalized because of the Roman Catholic position.
The theory of strict separation is at best tenuous. 24 It has never com-
manded a wide judicial following and probably never will. Moreover,
a short list of these points see L. PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 525-26. See also M. Kowrrz,
RELiGIOUs LIBERTY AND CONSCIENE (1968). An example of this type of argument is
the contention that the first amendment is designed to avoid religious-oriented antagon-
ism and strife which aid proposals might engender. However, strife avoidance should
not be elevated to a constitutional principle lest too much legislation is invalidated.
Notes 142-44 infra & accompanying text. Furthermore, the want of aid is as likely to
cause strife as is the grant of aid. Schwarz, supra. But see Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Related to the "avoidance of strife" argument is the contention that the Constitution
seeks to promote secular unity. Since aid to parochial schools impairs unity by en-
couraging a competing sytem of schools, the aid on which such a competing system
thrives is unconstitutional. But this argument is not supported by explicit Constitutional
provisions or case law. Also, one might suggest that diversity and variety are more
important in this area. See Schwarz, supra.
22. Most parochial schools in this country are operated by Roman Catholics. How-
ever, many other religious groups also operate schools and colleges.
23. Konvitz, Separation of Church and State, The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PaOB. 44, 58 (1949). Supporting this conclusion are papal statements such as, "[ilt is
necessary not only that religious instruction be given to the young at certain fixed
times, but also that every other subject taught, be permeated with Christian piety ....
[I]f this sacred atmosphere does not pervade . . .[the school, then] little good can be
expected ... I." ld. See generally M. KoNvirz, RELGIous LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE
(1968).
24. See note 162 infra & accompanying text. Even Thomas Jefferson, the author of
the phrase "separation of church and state," did not intend to erect an impregnable
wall between church and state. At the University of Virginia, Jefferson made plans
for schools of divinity on the campus. Katz, supra note 19, at 431.
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the Court has recognized that "we are a religious people." 5- TO-this
end, government aid to religion, in a wide variety of forms,26 annually
amounts to billions of dollars.2 7 Thus, from a pragmatic viewpoint the
question is not whether government may aid religion, but -what types
or forms of assistance are permitted by the first amendment.
B. Aid Is Required
The converse of the argument that the Constitution forbids govern-
ment from aiding parochial schools is the view that the Constitution
requires such aid.28  Government discrimination on the basis of re-
ligion violates the free exercise clause.2 For example, in Sherbert v.
25. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26. For a discussion of the various forms in which aid may be packaged see Note,
New Trends in Education and the Future of Parochial Schools, 57 CoaRNxm L. Rrv.
256, 263-74 (1972).
27. See Areen, Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools: A Breach in the Sacred Wall?,
22 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 230 (1971).
28. Also, an argument may be made that a denial of aid to parochial schools consti-
tutes an establishment of religion because the state would then prefer the secularism
implicit in public schooling. This results in the establishment of a secular "orthodoxy."
To allay the establishment of a secular "religion," the state must support religious
schools. But this argument is tenuous on two grounds: 1) although the teaching of
religion is prohibited in public schools it does not necessarily follow that a cult of
secularism reigns supreme, 2) even if such is true, to provide aid on these grounds
would only establish another religion-that of the particular church school-while the
Constitution forbids all establishments. See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
Parochial Schools, 56 CALin. L. Rlv. 260, 270 n59, 297 n.224 (1968). See also Gellhorn
& Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 418-20, who observe that if this argument were accepted,
several state constitutional provisions which forbid aid would have to be invalidated.
This prediction was sustained by Brusca v. Board of Educ, 92 S. Ct. 1493 (1972). In
Brusca, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate provisions of the Missouri Constitution which
forbade public aid to sectarian schools on the grounds that such a denial constituted a
violation of the free exercise clause. Plaintiffs relied upon Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), as upholding their right to send their children to a parochial school
and upon Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), as requiring the state to aid their
school, which requirement would invalidate the Missouri constitutional provision for-
bidding aid. The court did not accept these arguments because the Supreme Court
had denied aid to parochial schools, and although Pierce affirms a right to attend private
schools, Sherbert did not hold the state to a concomitant duty to establish or support
such schools.
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court held that the establishment
clause was not violated by government loans of secular textbooks to parochial school
children. However, neither the free exercise clause nor the equal protection clause re-
quired government to furnish the textbooks. See Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore.
238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
29. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) and Abernathy v. Irvine, 355 S.W.2d
159 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831 (1962), the Court upheld government
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Verner,0 a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied a claim for unemploy-
ment compensation because she would not accept a job which required
work on Saturday. The compensation statute denied assistance to one
who had "failed, without good cause,. . . to accept ... suitable work.
.. ., -1 State officials concluded that the plaintiff's refusal, which was
based on her religious beliefs, did not constitute "good cause." Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, said the government could not pressure
a citizen into foregoing religious belief by imposing an economic penalty
upon the exercise of that belief.3 2 Such a harsh choice-surrendering
religious convictions to qualify for state financial assistance-was held
to violate the free exercise clause because the availability of unemploy-
ment compensation was made to turn upon the compromising of reli-
gious scruples. 8
aid to religious hospitals. Although the argument was not made, this aid could not
have been denied merely on the grounds of the religious character of the recipient in-
stitutions without violating the free exercise clause.
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1962). Another case often cited by proponents of the "aid is
required" argument is Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). Quick Bear upheld
government grants which were used to advance Sioux children in parochial schools.
The grants, however, represented treaty installment payments owed by the govern-
ment to the Indians; thus, denial of the use of these funds for religious education would
have violated the free exercise of religion. The value of this case to the "aid" argu-
ment is severely limited because of the character of the funds. The money belonged
to the Indians; it was not a gratuitous appropriation.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114 (1962).
32. 374 U.S. at 404.
33. The argument is bolstered by Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), which held
that a municipality could not prevent a religious group from using a public park to
advance its religious proselytism even though raucous sound equipment was used.
Saia, which was decided on free exercise grounds, supports the proposition that freedom
of worship requires government to treat religious and non-religious groups alike. Con-
sequently, if public schools receive support from government so should parochial
schools, at least in those areas where parochial schools provide secular education. Cf.
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The force of Saia, however, was evis-
cerated by Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), which reached an opposite result
on similar facts. The Kovacs Court, although treating religious and non-religious groups
alike, held that both could be prohibited from engaging in disruptive conduct. The Saia
"freedom of religion" argument did not spare the Kovacs religious group from the opera-
tion of the ordinance. Three of the four Kovacs dissenters said Saia was overruled.
See also Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CoNrMz,.
PROB. 3, 7-8 (1949). Compare Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1952) (a city,
which allowed some religious groups to use a public park but not other religious
groups, was ordered to allow all religious groups to use the public facilities), 'witb
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time pro-
grams in public schools were prohibited) and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(released time programs, if not conducted in public schools, were upheld). See also
Schwarz, supra note 21, at 731-32.
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The "aid" theory is based on the dual premises that government re-
quires children to attend school 4 and that a parent's religious convic-
tions may require him to send his children to a parochial school. 5 A
necessary corollary-necessary in order to alleviate dangers of establish-
ment-is that the secular function of education is separable from the
religious so that aid supports education rather than religion.36 Under
this theory, if government provides financial support to public schools
but fails to provide similar aid to the secular functions of parochial
schools, then monetary assistance has been refused solely upon grounds
of religion." At present, a citizen whose child is enrolled in a church
related school bears the double burden of educating his child in a paro-
chial school while at the same time supporting public schools through
taxes.,8 Therefore, the argument is made that the Sherbert rationale
should apply here. The principle espoused in Sherbert was that a per-
son should not be forced to forego government benefits because of his
religious convictions. By analogy, those parents whose religious con-
victions require or urge them to educate their children in parochial
34. See, e.g, Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943); Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J, dissenting).
35. For example, many Roman Catholics believe that a cult of secularism pervades
public schools to such an extent that their children cannot be publicly schooled without
violating their religious convictions. See Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme
Court, 14 LAW & CoEmp. PsoB. 73 (1949).
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court upheld the right of a
religious organization to educate its members' children in a parochial school so long
as certain secular subjects, such as mathematics, were taught. The Pierce right-that
parents may direct their children's education through a choice of schools-is imperiled
if, through high costs to the parents, only the wealthy can afford to send their children
to church related schools. See Corwin, supra note 33, at 20.
36. In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), this distinction was upheld.
A state was permitted to provide textbooks to all schools, public or private, so long
as the books were about secular subjects. See also National Catholic Welfare Confer-
ence, The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church Related Schools in Federal Aid
to Education, 50 Gro. L.J. 397, 405 (1961).
37. See Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Wall: The Obsolescense of a Metaphor,
37 GEO. WAsm L. Rav. 223, 234 (1968), where it is noted that "Etlo compel a person
to choose between two rights, to relinquish one in order to exercise the other, deprives
him of the full benefits of citizenship ... :'
38. The financial outlay is twofold because such a citizen is taxed for public school
support and he must pay tuition to a parochial school. Stanmeyer, supra note 37, at
234. To argue that the latter expense is assumed freely, and thus is not an onerous
burden, is mistaken because such an argument ignores the citizen's religious convictions
which require him to educate his children in a parochial school. Id. at 239.
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schools are forced to choose between the financial exigencies of com-
pliance and less costly surrender of religious beliefs. In order to alle-
viate their hardship, the government must, it is argued, finance the secu-
lar education of parochial students.
Child Benefit
The absolute positions are not widely accepted and are of little help
in resolving the important question of what type of aid may be given
to parochial schools. As noted above, the real question is what forms
of aid may be or must be given. The Court has long recognized that
delineating between permissible and impermissible aid is a problem of
degree. 9 There is no bright line of distinction.40
The first formula advanced to separate the permissible from the
impermissible was the child benefit test. The foundation for this theory
was laid by Everson,41 which upheld, against an establishment clause
39. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
40. Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Betveen the "Establishment"
and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TExAs L. REv. 142, 154 (1963).
41. Two earlier cases, similar to the Everson test, deserve mention. In Borden v.
Board of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929), the court upheld Act No. 100 of
1928, called "The Free Text-Book Act," which provided public funds to purchase text-
books for the use of school children regardless of the school attended. The statute was
challenged, inter alia, on the grounds it conflicted with article 12, section 13 of
the Louisiana Constitution, which reads: "No public funds shall ever be used for the
support of any private or sectarian school. .. ." The court held that the statute did not
conflict with the Constitution because "[tihe appropriations were made for the
specific purpose of purchasing school books for the use of the school children of the
state. . . . It was for their benefit . . . that the appropriations were made. [Even
though] these 'children attend .. . [sectarian] school . .. [t]he schools ... are not the
beneficiaries of these appropriations.... ." Id. at 660.
The second case, a companion to Borden, Cochran v. Board of Educ., 168 La. 1030,
123 So. 664 (1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), concerned the same question. The
Louisiana Supreme Court analyzed the case as it had Borden. However, the Supreme
Court of the United States, 20 years before the first amendment was held to apply to
the states via the fourteenth amendment, examined the case to determine whether the
taking of private property was used for private purposes, which would have
violated the fourteenth amendment. Although the Supreme Court, in Cochran, quoted
heavily from the Louisiana court's decision in Borden in regard to the child bene-
fit theory, Cochran is not strong authority for the child benefit principle because
the case was decided upon fourteenth amendment grounds instead of the estab-
lishment clause. See generally La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Text-
books, Transportation and Medical Care, 13 J. Pu. L. 76, 80-81 (1964). For an-
other state case involving textbooks see Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195
N.Y.S. 715 (1922). For other commentary and state cases involving transportation see
L. PFEFFEs, supra note 5, at 562 nn.16 & 17; Rafalko, The Federal Aid to Private
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attack, a New Jersey statute42 authorizing the use of government funds
to transport children to parochial schools. Justice Black recognized that
some children might not have been able to attend a parochial school
without the aid of the statute;43 nevertheless, he agreed there was no
aid to religion because the statute "does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools .... 44
The child benefit test distinguishes permissible aid to a child or par-
ent from impermissible aid to a parochial school. 45 Permissibility hinges
upon the identity of the recipient. It is of no moment, under this test,
that religion or a parochial school is indirectly benefited, so long as the
aid accrues directly to the child. 4e Thus, Justice Black was able to
uphold the Everson aid provision even though it supported religion,
since the aid was categorized as facilitating safe transportation of chil-
dren to school.
The Everson child benefit test is unsatisfactory because it fails to
provide a meaningful distinction between aid which is permissible and
aid which is not. Almost any type of aid to parochial education may
be characterized as aid to children. In fact, all aid, even religious,
arguably is of some value to the children. The test employs an illusory
distinction-child or school-more by assertion than by logical analysis.
School Controversy: A Look, 3 DUQUESNE UJ. REv. 211, 233 n.98 (1965). For com-
mentators and cases critical of the child benefit theory see 13 WM. & MARY L.
Rlv. 233 n.14 (1971).
42. NJ. REv. STAT. § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1941).
43. 330 U.S. at 17.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Choper, supra note 28, at 313. Closely related to the child benefit theory is the
welfare benefit test which also arose out of Justice Black's Everson opinion. According
to this view, if aid is characterized as serving a legitimate secular social welfare end, as
opposed to furthering religious education, then it is permissible. See Freund, Public Aid
to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. 1Ev. 1680, 1682-83 (1969). Police and fire protection
are examples of permissible aid under this test. However, public salary supplements to
parochial teachers are not permissible. Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-
New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 590 (1969).
46. Rafalko, supra note 41, at 224-25. Examples of the types of aid which are, at least
arguably, permissible under the child benefit theory include textbooks, Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); federally provided teaching materials, Carey, The Child
Benefit System in Operation-Federal Style, 12 CATHoLic LAw. 185, 187 (1966); tuition
aid, Case Note, 29 FoRDHAm L. REv. 578, 580 (1961) contra, Swart v. South Burlington
Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 92 (1961); and
school lunches and health programs, Choper, supra note 28, at 313.
47. See, e.g., Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 245, 255, 122 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1941);
Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 416.
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It is difficult to understand why, for example, transportation payments
to parents are permissible while the same payments would be imper-
missible if given directly to the school.-8 Since the practical result is
the same, and since no sound reasons have been advanced for accept-
ance, 9 the test should be rejected. 50
Neutrality
A. The Kurland Proposal
Professor Kurland champions the proposition that government must
maintain a position of neutrality vis-a-vis religion. 51 In order to facili-
tate this neutrality the establishment clause must be merged with the
free exercise clause so that a single principle may emerge.52 The thesis
is stated as follows: "[G] overnment cannot utilize religion as a standard
for action or inaction because these clauses [establishment and free exer-
cise] prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit
or to impose a burden...." Thus, for example, government could not
48. Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial Schools-A Reply to Professor
Freund, 59 GEO. LJ. 59, 63 (1970).
In a effort to meet these objections Professor La Noue has suggested that the test is
viable if three limits are placed upon aid which is otherwise permissible under the test.
First, the school system cannot acquire property by the aid. Second, the state must
maintain control of the administration of public funds. Third, the aid cannot be used
for religious purposes. La Noue, supra note 41, at 90-91. Instead of accepting these
limitations the courts have rejected the test. Indeed, the second limitation may run
afoul of the Walz excessive entanglement test. Notes, 116-27 infra & accompanying text.
49. Note, Public Funds for Sectarian Schools, 60 HARv. L. REv. 793, 799 (1947). See
also L. PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 560; Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education
in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 347 (1950).
50. Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the First
Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 308 (1966).
51. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1
(1961), republished as P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND TnE LAW (1962). See also Kurland,
Politics and the Constitution: Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 1 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 475 (1966); Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389 (1963); Kauper, Book
Review, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 467 (1963).
52. By merging the clauses the apparent inconsistencies between them are eliminated.
Apart from merger, the inconsistency may be illustrated by the Conscientious Objector
Cases. If an exception to the selective service laws is based on religion then, at least
arguably, an establishment of religion results. But if the exemption is denied, the free
exercise of religion is denied to the objector. "Thus follows the curious result that an
exemption for the religious objector seems to be prohibited by the establishment clause
and at the same time required by the free exercise clause . . . ." Comment, supra note 6,
at 96. With merger of the clauses, however, it is not necessary to determine which
clause is paramount, as the absolutists attempt. Notes 4-38 supra & accompanying text.
Merger makes inconsistency impossible. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 693.
53. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 6
(1961).
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exempt parochial schools from property taxation on the basis of religion.
However, exemption could be predicated upon a larger secular category
such as a charitable institution or a private non-profit school." In order
for the parochial school's exemption to be upheld under this test all
other organizations within the secular category also would have to be
exempted. Viewed in this light, the test would allow public funds to
be spent even for strictly religious purposes if the legislative classifica-
tions were written broadly.5 5 Churches could be built with tax funds
if a legislature chose to subsidize the construction costs of all voluntary
associations to which a certain proportion of a community belonged. 5
This result, which is uniformly condemned, 57 amounts to an establish-
ment of religion.
Professor Kurland insists that perfect equality must exist between the
religious and the non-religious sectors. 8 For example, an ordinance
prohibiting raucous noises near churches would be unconstitutional
unless churches were classified within a secular group which included
other activities requiring tranquility.59 However, the neutrality prin-
54. Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 412.
55. The test would uphold grants to parochial schools if classified as grants to edu-
cational activities.
56. Choper, supra note 28, at 270-71.
57. Only those who believe that the free exercise clause requires aid to parochial
schools might support this result. However, even this school of thought is careful to
distinguish the secular function of parochial education from the religious function,
and to require aid only to the secular. Nevertheless, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
have advanced views similar to Professor Kurland's test. See, e.g, Comment, supra note
6, at 94 n.82.
58. L. PFEFTE, supra note 5, at 401-06, points out the extraordinary effect of this test
on several practices. For example, if the test were followed then: 1) school children
could not be exempted, on religious grounds, from state required flag salutes as occurred
in Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943); 2) state laws exempting Christian
Scientists from laws prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine would be un-
constitutional; 3) conscientious objections to military service on religious grounds
would be unconstitutional unless enlarged to include objections for secular reasons; 4)
marriages could not be legitimated by religious services; 5) government sponsored
chaplains for the military, prisons, hospitals, and legislatures would be prohibited; 6)
official references to God-whether on coins or in oaths of office-would be unconstitu-
tional; 7) special laws regarding churches, such as zoning ordinances excluding churches
from residential areas or those prohibiting the sale of alcohol near churches, would
be unconstitutional; and 8) state adoption laws which prefer adoptive parents who are
of the religion of the natural parents would be unconstitutional. See also Kauper,
supra note 51, at 473-74.
59. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 694-95.
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ciple does not prohibit government from granting special treatment to
a secular organization. Thus, a club or hospital by itself may benefit
from such a law, but a church can benefit only if it is classed within
such a group. Therefore, the neutrality principle is inconsistent with
its goal of equality because religious organizations suffer from disabili-
ties not visited upon secular groups.60
Although a few cases seem to support Professor Kurland, 6' the "no-
classification according to religion" test is not accepted by the Supreme
Court."' For example, in Sherbert, a law which failed to provide special
treatment for a religious group was invalidated on free exercise grounds. s
Murdock v. Pennsylvania" also upheld legal classifications which were
based on religion. Professor Kurland's test, which is inconsistent with
these decisions, is not likely to gain many adherents on the Court. The
most recent cases decided by the Burger Court, Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion65 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,6" have not applied the Kurland theory
even though Chief Justice Burger spoke of "benevolent neutrality." 6 T
It is clear that the Court's use of the term "neutrality" differs from
Kurland's, since, in Walz, the Court upheld religious property tax ex-
emptions which would have been invalid under the Kurland theory.
B. Giannella
Professor Giannella advances a neutrality theory76  which achieves
results different from those obtained by Professor Kurland's test. Gian-
60. Id.
61. Comment, supra note 6, at 94, suggests that Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); and Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946) support Kurland. Justice Harlan appears to have
embraced this position. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
62. This fact is recognized by Professor Kurland, who states that his doctrine is in
search of authority. Kurland, supra note 53, at 2.
63. Notes 30-38 supra & accompanying text.
64. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
65. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. 397 U.S. at 669. "Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there
is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference . . . ." Id.
(emphasis supplied).
68. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development
Part 11. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HAav. L. REv. 513 (1968); Giannella, Re-
ligious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part 1. The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. R~v. 1381 (1967). See also Freund, supra note 45;
Katz, supra note 19.
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neUa's proposition is based on a tripartite analysis of the values which
the first'amendment is designed to protect.69 The first value secured by
the amendment is the right of voluntary participation by citizens in
religious affairs. Concomitant with this is the right to be let alone, to be
free from government-supported proselytism. This is similar to Profes-
sor Schwarz' "no imposition" value.1 0 However, it is broader in scope.
In Giannella's view, if the voluntary actions of citizens do not sustain
religion, then religion should decline; Schwarz, on the other hand, would
allow aid if no imposition of religion resulted.71 From voluntarism flows
the second value ensconced in the religion clauses-mutual abstention.
Mutual abstention, strictly applied, means no aid to religion. However,
the third value, neutrality, qualifies the denial of aid to the extent that
the denial would adversely affect religion. In other words, neutrality
prohibits aid, unless the absence of aid causes injury to religious organi-
zations.12
Application of the two neutrality theories produces different results.
For example, Giannella allows government to participate in shared time
programs even though such participation is an incidental aid to religion.
Since the aid is only channeled to the secular portion of a parochial
school and because, in the absence of the aid, the educational standards
of parochial schools would drop below the standards of public schools,
government participation is acceptable. On the other hand, Kurland
disapproves of such a program because it is action based on a religious
classification.
The neutrality principle has been supported by the Supreme Court.
In Abington School District v. Schempp,74 Justice Clark presented a
neutrality principle, holding that a statute violates the establishment
clause when it is enacted with a religious purpose or when the statute's
primary effect advances or inhibits religion. 5 However, this test is
69. Valente & Stanmeyer, supra note 48, at 62.
70. Schwarz, The Nonestablisbment Principle: A Reply to Professor Giannella, 81
HAv. L. REv. 1465, 1468 (1968).
71. Giannella, supra note 69, at 517.
72. Comment, supra note 6, at 87.
73. This is thought to be an aid to religion because it releases funds which would
otherwise be spent for the same secular educational needs which the government funds
would subsidize. The freed funds could be spent for religious purposes.
74. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
75. Id. at 222. This statement in Schempp, which is widely quoted as an authoritative
test, was foreshadowed in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), where Chief
Justice Warren stated that if "[tihe present purpose and effect of the [statute]" is
primarily secular, then the 'establishment' clause is not violated. Id. at 445.
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confounded when confronted with the free exercise clause as applied
by Sherbert. As was noted earlier, the Sherbert Court76 invalidated a
statute which excluded a Seventh Day Adventist from unemployment
benefits because she would not, for religious reasons, work on Saturday.
Thus, by upholding Mrs. Sherbert's right to compensation, the Court
recognized the propriety of government action which has a religious
purpose and effect.7  Furthermore, the Sunday Blue Law Cases s rec-
ognize that legislation may be enacted even if it has a religious purpose.
Despite Chief Justice Warren's quaint supposition that the present pur-
pose of such laws is not to aid religion but merely to provide a uniform
day of rest, it is recognized that Sunday closing laws purposely and
effectively advance religion.79
Even if no free exercise question is involved, this neutrality theory is
unconvincing. The test suffers from a want of clarity in the phrase "a
primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion." Typically,
parochiaid legislation has sundry effects, secular and religious. But only
if the effect on religion is characterized as primary may the legislation
be invalidated. The problem is determining whether an effect is pri-
mary or incidental.80 Also, does "primary" mean "principal" or is it a
lesser effect, which is significant but not paramount?8 These questions
may be resolved by a balancing technique, and as such, are subject to the
inherent ambiguities and uncertainties of that approach. 2 A test which
can be applied only on a case-by-case basis in this area is not helpful.
This test also fails because "it invites the erroneous equation of quali-
tatively different incidental aids to religion and hence implies that ad-
76. The Sherbert and Scaempp cases were decided on the same day.
77. See also Comment, supra note 6, at 82-88. Under the neutrality theory this con-
frontation is resolved with the understanding that government may not aid, unless no
aid causes harm. Id. at 87. However, the attempt to reconcile the free exercise clause
with the establishment clause in this manner neglects the other alleged value of
voluntarism. Also, this test fails to set limits upon the extent of permissible aid. See
Schwarz, supra note 70, at 1472-73.
78. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
79. Cf. Schwarz, supra note 70, at 1471.
80. Justice Frankfurter has suggested the "alternative means" test. A statute designed
to meet secular needs which also aids religion is characterized as one having only an
incidental effect of advancing religion, and permissible as such, if there are no alterna-
tive means by which the secular end may be fulfilled. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420,462 (1961) (concurring opinion).
81. Valente, supra note 45, at 596-98. The commentators define the phrase differ-
ently. Compare Choper, supra note 28, at 278-83, zvitb Giannella, supra note 68, at
553-57.
82. Notes 101-12 infra & accompanying text.
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vancement of even an insubstantial secular need will always justify
any incidental religious effect . ." even if the aid imposes religious
beliefs upon citizens."'
The No Imposition Test
While Professor Kurland merges the establishment clause with the
free exercise clause to produce a theory of neutrality, Professor Schwarz
limits the effect of the establishment clause by means of a prohibition:
Government may not impose any religious belief upon its citizens.84
This does not preclude all aid; only that which results in imposition
is forbidden.8 5 Imposition occurs when government action or aid induces
religious belief.8 However, if aid "merely accommodates or imple-
ments an independent religious choice . . ." there is no imposition of
religion.87 Thus, aid which does not influence one's choice of religion
or non-religion is permissible. 8
Government aid to parochial schools, or to churches, which facilitates
religious exercise without engendering religious belief is per se lawful. 89
On the other hand, aid which amounts to government imposition is
per se unlawful. 0 If the aid directly or indirectly furthers the private
proselytism of religion, a balancing test is applied instead of a per se
rule.91 By receiving government aid, such as textbooks, a parochial
83. Schwarz, supra note 70, at 1472.
84. Schwarz, supra notes 21 & 70. Imposition is dangerous to individuals because
strife is engendered when one's taxes support another religion's efforts to proselytize.
Also, imposition vitiates an individual's free choice of religion. Aid amounting to an
imposition is dangerous to religious institutions because the aid might advance a com-
peting organization's beliefs. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 720-21.
85. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 693. Professor Schwarz recognized that the most effica-
cious method of preventing imposition is to prohibit all aid. But this conclusion conflicts
with the free exercise clause. Id. at 722.
86. ld. at 723.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 728. Aid which only intensifies a previously held belief does not constitute
such an influence according to Schwarz. For example, a bus subsidy to a parochial
school may intensify one's religious belief but it does not influence the free adoption of
the religious belief. Id.
89. Id. at 730.
90. Id.
91. Schwarz illustrates the difference between imposition and private proselytism
by comparing Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1952) with Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1947). In Fowler a city was required to
allow a religious group to use a public park, but in McCollum a religious group was
forbidden from teaching consenting students in a public school. Schwarz distinguishes
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school may have additional funds-those freed from the necessity of
buying textbooks-with which to advance its religious beliefs vis-a'-vis
non-believers. This type of aid is a prima facie violation of the estab-
lishment clause unless the violation is overcome by counterbalancing
factors. The most important factor suggested by Professor Schwarz
is whether aid directly advances proselytism. 2 If it does, the balance
is weighted in favor of imposition and the aid is unlawful. Other factors,
less crucial to the equation, include whether proselytising aid is shared
equally by religious and non-religious organizations; whether aid to a
nonproselytising function may be converted to proselytism; and whether
the aid is substantial. 3
Much case law supports the no imposition theory that the establish-
ment clause is designed to prevent government from imposing a religion
upon citizens.94 If only imposition is prohibited, then government may
aid religion.95 For example, not only may a state provide secular textbooks
to parochial schools, as was upheld in Board of Education v. Allen,9"
but a state could furnish religious books as well.97 Religious books would
not be an imposition because they, at most, only intensify a previously
held religious belief.98 But no imposition is not the only establishment
clause principle. 99 For example, as will be seen below, Walz declares
the holdings on the ground that in MoCollum an aura of authority was conferred upon
the religious group by the mere use of the school, so this constituted aid to proselytism.
Schwarz, supra note 21, at 731-32.
92. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 734.
93. Id. at 735.
94. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311
(1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Ever-
son v. Board of Educ, 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Schwarz, supra
note 21, at 721.
95. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 712. This aid would be permissible because religion
is not an exclusively private affair; consequently, public funds are not being expended
for private purposes. Religion is, in part, properly the subject of government bounty
because religion, inasmuch as it supports the civil order or the social fabric, serves a
public function. Id. at 712-13. Schwarz lists and rebuts five reasons which have been
advanced for prohibiting aid to religion. Id. at 709-20.
96. 392 US. 236 (1968).
97. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 693.
98. Notes 67-69 supra & accompanying text.
99. No imposition is widely accepted as an establishment clause value except, perhaps,
by those who believe aid is mandatory. Professor Schwarz observes that "[lit is agreed
that the establishment clause prohibits government from intentionally creating an
official or preferred religion... [but] at this point agreement ends...." Schwarz, supra
note 21, at 709.
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that aid programs cannot excessively entangle government with religion.
Further, Schempp forbids any aid which purposely advances religion.' °
The Balancing Technique
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, this case-by-case
approach10' weighs "the public benefit in each instance against the aid
to religion ... ." 102 The decision in Everson is an illustration of the
balancing process. 0 3 The Court upheld a statute which reimbursed par-
ents for fares paid for the transportation of their children to parochial
schools. Busing necessarily aided religion since some children might
not have otherwise been able to attend parochial school. On the other
hand, the statute promoted the safety of children who would otherwise
be walking to and from school. Because the Court believed walking was
more dangerous than riding, the safety factor outweighed the religious
aid.
Balancing examines a myriad of other factors which are weighed
against religious aid. These factors might include
whether the state's purpose is religious or secular, the importance
in terms of priorities of the public purpose, the relative probability
of its accomplishment, the type and quantum of benefit given to
religion, whether funds will be freed, the relative strength of sec-
tarian influences operative within a particular recipient institution,
the relationship of the benefit to the religious aspects of the insti-
100. But Schwarz neatly counters this objection. Although the Court repeatedly
pontificates that if the purpose of a statute is to aid religion, as religion, instead of as a
part of some broader general category, then the establishment clause is violated.
However, the Court is not true to its own doctrine because, in Zorach, the Court
upheld a released time program whose only purpose was to aid religion. Zorach
eviscerates the "no religious" purpose doctrine.
101. This test is also called the "direct-indirect" or the "active-passive" test. Choper,
supra note 28, at 324 nn.445 & 446.
102. Note, Tracing the "Wall": Religion in the Public School System, 57 YALE LJ.
1114, 1121 (1948).
103. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), also illustrates the balancing tech-
nique. The aid to religion resulting from a Sunday closing law was outweighed by the
public need for a day of rest. Professor Schwarz suggests that the Court erred by up-
holding such a statute since the public benefit of a mere day of rest is less compelling
than children's safety was in Everson. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 703. Continuing
debate upon the appropriateness of the result under a balancing test underscores the
unpredictability of the test. Notes 101-12 infra & accompanying text. See also Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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tution aided, [and] the extent to which the state selects the insti-
tutions to be aided.10
Balancing considers these factors, and many others, without assigning
a high or low priority to any of them.10 5 In some circumstances, a
statute which confers a slight religious advantage will not violate the
establishment clause because of a greater secular public benefit; in other
instances it will not. Thus, a state may educate all students to the
natural dangers of drinking alcohol, while similar admonitions would
be disallowed if drinking were treated as a sin.'
Balancing presents questions of degree,1 7 in which courts have great
leeway in upholding or striking down "aid" legislation.0 " The circum-
stances of each case control. But the circumstances present such a
welter of diverse factors (all of which are computed in the balancing
equation, none of which have been designated priorities) that predic-
tion as to whether a particular "aid" proposal is constitutional is haz-
ardous. 109 Since stable prediction is impossible, legislatures will be un-
able to face confidently the question of whether a particular form of
parochiaid is possible, much less wise. Also, under this approach an
extraordinary divergence of holdings among the lower courts could be
expected." 0
Another shortcoming of the balancing process is its failure "to iden-
tify and analyze the evil resulting from an aid to or advancement of
religion .... " -"' If the nature and the weight of religious aid is not
appreciated, the balancing equation is stymied. Or, if it is able to reach
104. Choper, supra note 28, at 324. See also Comment, Hospital Aid and the Estab-
lishment Clause: Conflict or Acconnodation?, 13 U.C.LAJA. REv. 1100, 1109-12 (1966).
105. Valente, supra note 45, at 606.
106. Id.
107. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See also Choper, supra note 28, at 324.
108. Valente, supra note 45, at 606.
109. Choper, supra note 28, at 325.
110. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 704. Contra, Valente, supra note 45, at 606-07. Pro-
fessor Valente contends that balancing will produce tentative results only in the early
stages of its application. After a series of precedental cases are decided by the Supreme
Court the uncertainty will cease, or at least diminish. Id. This neglects two factors.
First, the total circumstances of each case may vary substantially so that a test which
fails to designate priorities must be reexamined anew with each set of circumstances.
Second, a particular circumstance, the forms in which aid may be packaged, are them-
selves diverse. There are thousands of aid programs. A case decision on one par-
ticular form of aid, such as a school lunch program, would not necessarily provide
guidance for another case involving a different type of aid, such as a tuition plan.
I11. Schwarz, supra note 21, at 702.
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an answer, the answer will be inexplicable. Everson declared that the
public benefit-safety-was more important than an incidental aid to
religion. But why? What if the reduced safety factor were minimal?
Suppose accidents were reduced by only a tenth of one percent, while
the religious aid proved substantial, such as an increased enrollment of
20 percent due to the free transportation: would the same result fol-
low?' 12 Perhaps, but balancing fails to provide a clear answer.
Quid Pro Quo
Professor Choper proposes that "governmental financial aid may be
extended directly or indirectly to support parochial schools without
violation of the establishment clause so long as such aid does not exceed
the value of the secular educational service rendered by the school.
. .., 113 According to this test, it is of no moment that government
grants to parochial schools would release other funds, or indeed, that
the grant itself was spent for a purely religious purpose such as the
purchase of Bibles. The only limit is that the aid appropriated cannot
exceed the value of the secular services offered by the school.114 Thus,
if a particular parochial school spends $300,000 annually for its mathe-
matics, spelling, reading, and other secular programs, then this amount
is the maximum which could be received under the quid pro quo theory.
Professor Choper reasons that since the government would only be
repaying the parochial schools for funding services which the govern-
ment would have had to spend in any event to create new public
schools, no public funds would be used for religious purposes. The
government would only be buying educational services, much like other
governmental purchases of services.115
EXCESsivE ENTANGLEMENT
The Walz Concept
In order to appreciate whether these theories (Absolutes, Child Ben-
112. Id.
113. Choper, supra note 28, at 265-66 (emphasis omitted). Professor Choper is the
leading advocate of the quid pro quo theory. For other advocates see Choper at
266 nn.37 & 38.
114. Another limit, of course, is that any aid would have to be offered to all religious
groups, not just to a particular church school.
115. Choper, supra note 28. Excluding religious organizations from selling educa-
tional services, on the basis of religion, arguably is a violation of the free exercise clause.
See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Abernathy v. Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831 (1962).
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efit, Neutrality, No Imposition, and Quid Pro Quo) are viable, it is
necessary to examine several recent Supreme Court decisions. In Walz
v. Tax Commission,116 an owner of real estate in New York sought to
enjoin the New York Tax Commission from granting tax exemption
status to church-owned property. The property was used primarily
to promote the religious beliefs of the various churches. Appellant
argued that by exempting the churches from property taxes the govern-
ment forced him indirectly to aid religion. By contending that an
exemption is similar to a government subsidy in its effect, the taxpayer,
relying on the Everson "no aid" dictum, urged the Court to invalidate
the New York exemption as violative of the establishment clause. 11
Chief Justice Burger, writing the opinion of the Court, twitted those
who place "too much weight on a few words or phrases of the
Court .... " 118 The Everson dictum, which has caused much of the
confusion regarding both clauses, was rejected. The Chief Justice ob-
served "that for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity...." '19 Thus, the clauses do not prohibit all aid since "[n] o
perfect or absolute separation is really possible. . " 12
The Court held that property tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions which use the property solely for religious purposes is not viola-
tive of the establishment clause. Prefacing their examination with the
cautionary words that the religion clauses "are not the most precisely
drawn portions of the Constitution ... 121 the Court applied the
Schempp secular purpose and primary effect test.122 The legislative pur-
pose of the exemption was secular because religious property tax exemp-
tions were included in a broad array of exemptions such as those for
116. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
117. Appellant did not contend that his free exercise rights were abrogated.
118. 397 U.S. at 670.
119. Id. at 668.
120. Id. at 670.
121. ld. at 668.
122. "The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and' the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibi-
tion of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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libraries and hospitals.las The Court also concluded that the tax exemp-
tion met the Schempp effect criteria-the primary effect of a statute
may not advance or inhibit the practice of religion.
However, Chief Justice Burger couched the test of effect, not in the
phraseology of Schempp, but as follows: "We must also be sure that
the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion .. ,, 124 The Court, after observing that "[t]he test is
inescapably one of degree," 125 examined three factors to determine
whether property tax exemptions result in impermissible entanglement.
First, exemptions did not result in sponsorship because they are only
an abstention from taxing and not a transfer of money.126 Second, an
exemption is less entangling than taxation because the latter increases
the likelihood of continuing a day-to-day involvement of government
"by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax fore-
closures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the
train of those legal processes." 127 Third, tax exemptions, pursuant to
a policy of benevolent neutrality toward religion, have been granted
throughout the history of the United States.
The Walz Aftermath: Lemon and the DiCenso Cases
Subsequent to Walz, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,128 Early v.
DiCenso,129 and Robinson v. DiCenso,30 applied the concept of exces-
sive entanglement. Lemon and the DiCenso cases involved state statutes
which sought, inter alia, to supplement the salaries of parochial school
teachers who taught secular subjects.
In the DiCenso cases, the Rhode Island legislature sought to enhance
the caliber of parochial school education by authorizing a salary sup-
123. This reasoning appears mistaken. An exemption is no less assistance merely
because it is extended to other groups and to all religions. The Court might do better
to recognize forthrightly that some legislation, even though not commanded by the
free exercise clause, may properly have a religious purpose. So long as the legislative
purpose is not to promote impermissibly or to sponsor religion it should be of little
moment that a statute is designed to aid religion. The Court suggested this approach
by stating that "wie find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social
welfare services or 'good works' that some churches perform. .. 397 U.S. at 674.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 675.
127. Id. at 674.
" '128. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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plement for teachers of secular subjects. As a result of such a supple-
ment, the parochial schools would have been enabled to compete with
the public schools in attracting teachers, whereas in the absence of the
supplement parochial school teachers would receive considerably less
remuneration. The supplements could not exceed 15 percent of a
teacher's salary, nor could a teacher's total salary, including the supple-
ment, exceed that of public school teachers. The legislature placed four
other limitations on eligibility for the supplements. First, the parochial
school's per-pupil expenditure was required to be lower than the state
average for public schools. In order to insure that this provision was
observed the parochial schools were required to submit appropriate
financial data to the Commissioner of Education. However, if those
expenditures exceeded the state norm, supplements could still be granted
so long as the parochial expenses for secular education-excluding those
expenses attributable to religious programs-were lower than the state
average. Second, the teachers could teach only those courses which were
taught in the public schools. The third limitation allowed the use of
only those textbooks and other materials used in the public schools.
Lastly, the recipient teachers could not teach any religious courses.
In Lemon, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a similar statute.
However, instead of paying salary supplements to teachers, the state
Superintendent of Public Instruction was authorized to "purchase" sec-
ular educational services from parochial schools. There were several
limitations on receiving the aid. First, the school had to maintain rec-
ords which distinguished the cost of secular education from the cost
of religious education. Those records were subject to state audit. Sec-
ond, only enumerated secular subjects which were taught in the public
schools could be bought by the state. Third, public officials had to
approve the textbooks and other materials used in the courses. Finally,
the state could not reimburse the school for any course which contained
religious teachings.
The Court held that both state aid programs resulted in excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion so as to violate the establishment
clause.' 31 The phrase "excessive entanglement" is new. It first appeared
in Walz, then in Lemon, DiCenso, and Tilton v. Richardson.' In order
to understand whether excessive entanglement is also a new doctrine
131. The Court also concluded that the purpose of the enactments was secular. The
question of whether the primary effect was legitimate was not decided.
132. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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against which statutes are to be measured, it is necessary to analyze the
elements of the Court's holding.
Excessive entanglement focuses primarily upon three areas: 1) the
nature of the institution which receives the aid, 2) the form of the aid,
and 3) the relationship between government and religion arising from
the aid. 33 In the first area, the Court, in DiCenso, observed that the
schools were located in close proximity to the sponsoring churches; the
schools contained religious symbols; religious classes and extracurricular
activities were conducted, and most of the teachers were nuns. To-
gether, these factors allowed the Court to conclude that "parochial
schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose." 13 While
this is scarcely a revelation it is important because it qualifies the dis-
tinction drawn in Board of Education v. Allen 35 between the secular
and the religious portions of parochial schools. Arguably, under Allen,
government could completely fund the secular portion of a parochial
school and still avoid a prohibited establishment of religion. However,
since the distinction is considered illusory' 36-at least in some degree-
the nature of the aided school may give rise to impermissible entangle-
ments.
The nature of the aid, the second area examined by the Court, must
be "secular, neutral, or non-ideological. . . ." ' ' This includes services,
facilities, or materials. If the statute had limited the aid to materials,
instead of including salary supplements, it could have met this require-
ment. Or, if the Allen distinction had been applied, the salary supple-
ments could have been considered as secular, and thus permissible. Most
aid easily fits into the secular category. The form of the aid, grants or
buses, is important in that it often determines the relationship between
government and religion. Even in Lemon the form of the aid did not
give rise to entanglements, but only enhanced those entanglements which
arose from the resulting relationship between religion and government.
The third area-the resulting relationship-is the heart of excessive
entanglement. The fact that the schools were of a religious character
133. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971).
134. Id.
135. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See also Valente, supra note 45.
136. Throughout Chief Justice Burger's opinion in DiCenso, subtle attacks are made
upon the Allen distinction. For example, Allen is cited as authority for the Schempp
test instead of as authority for the religious-secular distinction. Also, the Court ob-
serves that only in the "abstract" are the two separable. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 616-17 (1971).
137. Id. at 616.
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caused the Rhode Island legislature "to provide for careful governmental
controls and surveillance by state authorities in order to ensure that state
aid supports only secular education." -3 8 Thus, surveillance procedures
were initiated to guard against the possibility that a teacher who re-
ceived a supplement would inculcate religious views in the classroom.
It was this surveillance which the Court found intolerable. It is inter-
esting to speculate whether the same result would follow if no surveil-
lance controls had been enacted. Professor Choper would suggest that
it really does not matter whether a teacher, while teaching a class such
as a foreign language, injects religion into the classroom because the
state, through its aid, is only reimbursing the school quid pro quo. The
state should be satisfied that the children learn the secular subject mate-
rial, instead of inquiring whether a teacher injects religion into the class.
The Court, however, rejects this view. Without clearly explaining its
reasoning that the Allen distinction is limited or the importance of the
inculcation of religion by a teacher whose salary is supplemented, the
Court only concludes that "the potential for impermissible fostering
of religion is present." '-9 The Court says that it "cannot ignore the
dangers that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the
separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-
college education." 140 What danger? A parochial school is expected
to inculcate religious beliefs; that is its reason for existence. So long as
government funds do not support this inculcation-and they would not
if limited to the economic value of secular education in parochial schools
-it should be constitutionally immaterial whether a foreign language
teacher chooses to teach the language with religious illustrations. Even
though this would advance religion, the state would be financing only
the secular subject taught because the amount of the aid, under the quid
pro quo theory, would be limited to the value of the secular subject.
Entanglement also arose from the Rhode Island statutory exclusion
of those teachers who taught in parochial schools which spent more
money, on a per-pupil basis, for secular education than did the public
schools. In order to enforce this exclusion the state would have to
inspect school records. This inspection was held to entangle govern-
ment with religion.141
138. Id.
139. Id. at 619.
140. id. at 617 (emphasis supplied).
141. The Court also held that the Pennsylvania statute suffered from the same con-
stitutional infirmities. In addition, under the Lemon program, the benefits were paid
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In addition to the three areas above in which impermissible entangle-
ments might arise, the Court discussed "[a] broader base of entangle-
ment of... a different character [which] is presented by tl}e divisive
political potential" of the aid legislation. 142 The Court hypothesizes that
when advocates suggest that parochial schools should receive state aid,
the political spirits of voters and legislators will become so animated
that "other issues of great urgency" "13 will be obscured. Voters, it is
suggested, will take sides according to their religion. This is especially
true, argues the Chief Justice, when the proposals are such that they
recur annually, as would salary supplements.
This portion of the opinion is unclear and appears to reflect poor
logic. It has three defects. First, it seems strange to invalidate legislation
already enacted out of a fear that such legislation would so arouse the
legislators' spirits that they would be unable to conduct 8ther business.
The Pennsylvania and Rhode Island legislatures did not suffer from this
supposed disability while they were at work with the Lemon and
DiCenso aid proposals. At least there was nothing in the evidence which
suggested any dereliction of their other duties. Second, to invalidate
legislation because "[i]t would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that
many people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes
aligned with their faith" 14 is even less tenable. Many civil rights laws
were enacted because religious groups felt that their religious beliefs
impelled them to crusade for such laws. Their votes were aligned with
their faith; is the legislation therefore invalid? Also, in regard to public
school bond proposals, it is realistic to expect that parochial parents are
likely to vote against increased taxes because their children, who are
in a parochial school, will not benefit directly. Again, their voting is
determined by their religion, yet the bond programs are obviously
valid. Legislation should not be constitutionally tested according to
whether citizens might believe their religious convictions require a par-
ticular political decison. A third defect with this portion of the en-
tanglement theory is that it does not distinguish between an aid pro-
gram which might result in divisiveness and an aid program which will
not. Apparently, salary supplements are unconstitutionally divisive.
to the schools which, in the Court's view, constituted a further defect. Apparently
the Court is willing to accept, at least for the purpose of. invalidating a statute, the
discredited child benefit test. Id. at 621.
142. Id. at 622.
143. Id. at 623.
144. Id. at 622.
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But why is the supplying of books, buses, and school lunch programs
less divisive? It is an artificial distinction that such supplements are
recurrent; so also are numerous other forms of aid conferred annually
upon the parochial schools. Thus it would seem that the "potential
for political strife" basis of excessive entanglements should be rejected.
Tilton
The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963'54 sustains con-
struction grants to church related institutions of higher education so long
as the constructed facilities are not used for religious purposes. The
Court in Tilton upheld the Act against establishment and free exercise
attacks.' 46 After, noting that the purpose of the Act was secular, 4 7 Chief
Justice Burger, as in Lemon and DiCenso, focused his entanglement
inquiry upon four areas: 1) the nature of the recipient institution, 2)
the form of the aid, 3) the resulting relationship, and 4) the likelihood
of political strife. In each of these areas Tilton was distinguished from
Lemon and DiCenso. First, the colleges in Tilton, unlike the elementary
and high schools in Lemon, were not permeated with a religious at-
mosphere. The colleges, which subscribed to elevated principles of
academic freedom, allowed each professor considerable latitude in
teaching the subject matter of his course. Also, the Court noted that
college students were somewhat more sophisticated than their counter-
parts in elementary and high schools and, as such, were less suspectible
to any religious indoctrination which might occur. In the second area,
the form of the aid, the Chief Justice stated that salary-supplemented
teachers might not be neutral but that governmentally constructed build-
ings are necessarily neutral. Teachers may propagate their religious
views, but buildings cannot; thus, there is no need for Congress to
implement surveillance procedures similar to those enacted by the Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania legislatures. In the third area, the resulting
relationship, the government would have to inspect the buildings peri-
odically to ensure against infractions such as the use of the buildings as
chapels or the hanging of religious symbols therein; however, these
inspections would be required less frequently than those in Lemon.
145. 20 U..C. §§ 701-58 (1970).
146. The Act allowed the colleges, after a 20-year period, to use the buildings for
any purpose. The Court invalidated this portion of the Act. Since the buildings might
have been used for religious purposes, such as a church, to have allowed the reversion
would have constituted a gift to a religious group. 403 U.S. 672, 683.
147. Id. at 677.
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Another distinction drawn by the Court was that construction grants
would be made but once, whereas salary supplements would be granted
annually. Finally, the Chief Justice concluded that "[n]o one of these
... factors standing alone is necessarily controlling... [but] cumula-
tively all of them shape a narrow and limited relationship [between
church and state] ... [and] substantially lessen the potential for divisive
religious fragmentation in the political arena . ".. . 148
The Excessive Entanglement Cases Compared
The first question that arises from a comparison of the four cases is
whether the concept of excessive entanglement refines what Schempp
called primary effect, or whether it is an additional criteria. Walz sug-
gested that primary effect was defined in terms of entanglement. 49
Lemon, however, stated that there are three tests: purpose, effect, and
entanglement. The Chief Justice, having written all four opinions, may
have been sensitive to this problem because in Lemon he explicitly stated
that these tests are cumulative.1 ° Regardless of whether one defines
"excessive entanglement" as a component of the effect test, or as an
additional guideline, the same result obtains.
A related, but more important, inquiry is whether excessive entangle-
ment represents a new test or is only a new phrase describing settled
law. Professor Kauper, referring only to Walz, asserts that "while
the entanglements terminology is new, the substance of the idea as an
important consideration in the interpretation of the establishment clause
is not .... 151 He buttresses his opinion by observing that the con-
curring Justices in Walz spoke of involvements, instead of entangle-
ments, between church and state. Involvement appears to be synony-
mous with entanglement; both are prohibited if they become excessive.
However, merely to equate the two does not answer the question of
whether the Court has enunciated new guidelines.
Although there is language in Schempp-that foreshadows the concept
of excessive entanglement, a strong argument may be made that the
concept is a new test which, in its effect, is more restrictive than pre-
148. Id. at 688.
149. Shortly after the Walz decision, the early commentators suspected that the
Schempp effect test was defined by excessive entanglement. See, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HTAiv. L. Rnv. 1, 127 (1970).
150. 403 U.S. 602, 612.
151. Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amenf-
nent, 69 MicK. L. REv. 179, 201 (1970).
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vious case law., Chief Justice Burger, in Lemon, seems to state this con-
clusion by describing three tests instead of the two which are commonly
associated with Schempp. Furthermore, the only case used to support
the additional test-excessive entanglement-was Walz. Since only Walz
was cited, it is logical to suspect that Walz spawned this new concept.
A more incisive way of examining this question is to apply the pre-
vious case-law guidelines to the problems illustrated in the Lemon
trilogy in order to see whether the same result would obtain. This is
a two-step process. First, Schempp forbade those laws which have as
their purpose or primary effect the advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion. The Court has recognized that "primary" effect means "prin-
cipal" effect as opposed to an "important," but incidental, effect. 52 Thus,
under Schemp.p it matters not that a statute advances religion, even as
religion, so long as this is not its primary effect. A Lemon salary sup-
plement does. not. have as 'its primary effect the advancement of reli-
gion.153 This conclusion- becomes clear by applying the second step.
Allen distin.guishes the secular portion of a church related school from
the religious portion,1' allowing government to aid the secular part even
though religion would simultaneously receive some benefit. The salary
supplements, which were given only to teachers of secular subjects,
could have been characterized as aid only to the secular portion of the
parochial schools. Thus, the religious benefit would have been inci-
dental, not primary. Therefore, the Schempp test could have been satis-
fied. However, since the statutes were invalidated, and on grounds
other than purpose or effect, it becomes apparent that the Court has
enunciated new, more restrictive, guidelines for parochiaid questions. 55
Lemon: A Lost Opportunity?
Lemon dffoided'the Court an opportunity to develop lucid, realistic
guidelines. As Justice White suggested in his dissent, the majority's
152. 403 U.S. 602, 613-14.
153. The Court did not decide whether the statute's effect was to advance religion.
Id.
154. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 661-71 (1971) (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
155. The difference between primary effect and entanglement may be illustrated by
the School' Prayer Cases. For a state to require prayers at public schools would be
violative of the establishment clause because their primary effect would be advancement
of religion. However, even though such a statute would result in an impermissible effect,
it would .not necessarily *cause excessive administrative entanglement between church
and state. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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argument for excessive entanglement was make-weight 5 6 It distin-
guished college teachers from high school teachers and concluded that
because the former would not teach religion in their classes the con-
struction grants could be given. And since the high school teachers
might teach religion they wotild be denied salary supplements. This
distinction, if valid, should be inverted. College teachers, protected by
academic freedom, are more likely to inculcate their views than are
teachers in high schools who must more closely observe established
standards of instruction.157 A more important shortcoming of Lemon
is that it deprecated the distinction between the secular and the sectarian
parts of education. Since parochial schools clearly perform a dual func-
don-they teach secular and religious classes-the Court was presented
with a perfect opportunity to confirm this distinction by upholding the
secular-benefit statutes. Whether this opportunity has been permanently
lost is problematic. Certainly the likelihood is diminished. The Court
would have done better to recognize that "the States and the Federal
Government are financing a separable secular function of overridingimportance .... " ,,158
Whether administrative relationships develop between church and
state should be of little importance in determining whether an aid statute
results in an impermissible establishment of religion. The argument that
relationships lead to government control of religion should not be dis-
positive because the church, if it fears government coercion, need not
accept any aid which has unacceptable strings attached. Furthermore,
if the controls threaten to become overbearing, the parochial school
could rely upon the free exercise clause to assert its rights.
The argument that relationships in the abstract constitute an estab-
lishment of religion is also faulty. The purpose of the first amendment
was not to deny all aid to religion; even more clearly, its purpose was
not to prohibit the advancement of secular education. Despite selected
and celebrated dicta 9 and' arguments00 to the contrary, the more
156. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662-63 (1971).
157. Additionally, there was no evidence that either set of teachers had inculcated
religious doctrine. Furthermore, many of the high school teachers were lay teachers
who were of faiths different from the church school in which they taught. The likeli-
hood of their teaching the parochial school's religious views seems especially remote.
158. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662-63 (1971).
159. Note 7 supra.
160. Note 14 supra.
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authoritative analyses' 61 of the history of the amendment conclude that
its purpose was to prohibit favoritism among the competing religious
organizations and to prohibit the establishment of a state-church. So
long as a particular religion is not set above others and no citizen is
coerced into a religious belief, aid which is offered without discrimina-
tion to all church related schools to advance the secular education of
their pupils should not be considered a violation of the establishment
clause.
ExcEssivE ENTANGLEMENT AND THE THEORIES
Despite its shortcomings, excessive entanglement is part of the law
and hence it is necessary to apply the concept to the various theories
in order to assess their present vitality. It should be noted initially that
the Court's choice of words and phrases in the Lemon trilogy of cases
is not designed to facilitate this inquiry. The Court, while warning
against the dangers of pouncing upon a select phrase to enhance one's
favorite theory, seems to amalgamate into these cases the terminology
relied upon by all of the various commentators. This is perhaps because
of the Court's own uncertainty of direction, and consequent unwilling-
ness to foreclose available options.
The Absolute Positions
Despite this limitation, certain conclusions about the theories may be
drawn. Both absolute positions-that aid is forbidden or that it is re-
quired-are now untenable. The Everson "no aid" theorists have been
groping for supportive reasoning since that case was decided. A series
of recent cases from Allen to Tilton conclusively establishes the propo-
sition that at least some forms of aid may be given. The "no aid" theo-
rists must recognize that their dogma has been unceremoniously rejected.
Theorists who hold that the free exercise clause requires that aid be
given also have been dealt a setback. Although this precise issue was
not litigated in Lemon and DiCenso, the cases appear to reject this
proposition. To say the least, it would be difficult for a court to hold
that aid is required in light of two Supreme Court cases that prohibit
particular forms of aid. In Brusca v. Board of Education'6 2 the Su-
preme Court recently affirmed a district court rejection of this theory.
161. See Corwin, supra note 33, who stated that the Court is wrong in its interpreta-
tion of history.
162. 92 S. Ct. 1493 (1972). The facts of this case are summarized in note 28 supra.
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Some vitality remains in the theory, however. Although the free
exercise clause does not require government aid in all forms, it seems
plausible that there are certain minimum standards of assistance, the
denial of which would violate the spirit of the clause. For example, if
a city were to prohibit its fire department from extinguishing burning
parochial schools, a strong argument could be made that such conduct
constituted coercive state action against those who held religious beliefs.
This action would thus deny citizens their rights to religious freedom
because it discriminates upon the basis of religion.
The problem is that some aid is constitutionally required, some is
forbidden, and there is a middle area between that which is forbidden
and that which is required. In this area the legislature may aid religion.
There are no cases which have established the lower limits to that aid
which is required. It is a safe guess, however, that the line is consider-
ably lower than the "aid-is-required" theorists would desire. It is prob-
able that only those services which are properly categorized as general
welfare services, such as police and fire protection, municipal sewage
facilities, and the like, are required.10
Child Benefit
This theory retains only minimal viability. Although the Court, al-
most as an afterthought, couched a part of its Lemon opinion in terms
of child benefit by noting that Everson and Allen conferred aid to stu-
dents and parents whereas Lemon conferred its aid upon the schools,
the distinction was not meant to provide a test. It is here that the Chief
Justice's caution against selecting a few choice phrases of the Court
should be observed.
Clearly, however, the identity of the recipient of aid may determine
whether there is an impermissible entanglement. In this respect the
theory is important. For example, if government were to provide tax
credits to parochial parents, or to grant "scholarships" to parochial chil-
dren, the child benefit distinction could be argued to the extent that
direct financial benefit to citizens evidences a lack of involvement be-
tween church schools and government.'x
163. Even this categorization may be limited, since busing is permissible but not
required.
164. Note, New Trends in Education and the Future of Parochial Schools, 57
CoiNELLrL. REv. 256, 271-73 (1972).
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The Neutrality Positions
Professor Kurland's theory-that religion may not be used as a stand-
ard for governmental action or inaction-did not receive support by
the Lemon trilogy. Since this position has never received the Court's
approval, the concept of excessive entanglement does not affect the
Kurland neutrality principle.
The Giannella neutrality theory, based largely upon Scbempp, was
supported by the Court. However, it was modified in two ways. First,
"primary" was interpreted to mean "principal," instead of only "im-
portant." Legislation usually produces many different effects; only the
primary or the principal effect, however, and not the other ancillary,
albeit important, effects are considered. Second, the test was restricted
by the application of the entanglement principle.
No Imposition and Quid Pro Quo
That government may not impose a belief upon non-believers is
clearly a part of the prohibition of the first amendment. Since, in the
Court's view, the amendment also prohibits entanglements, aid which
the no imposition test would approve might be invalidated under the
entanglement concept. Salary supplements, for example, would not
impose religious beliefs upon pupils at parochial schools. Even if the
teachers did inculcate religion, such espousal could only serve to expand
or reinforce the beliefs that presumably would already have been
held by those who would choose to attend parochial schools. Conse-
quently, the no imposition test was implicitly rejected.
The quid pro quo theory was likewise rejected. The Lemon and
DiCenso statutes were built upon this model: they sought to fund or to
purchase only the secular educational services offered by parochial
schools. The most optimistic conclusion regarding the survival of the
quid pro quo theory is that it was only qualified by entanglement. If a
legislature can devise a purchase scheme which avoids both administrative
involvement and exacerbated political spirits, perhaps the statute could
be approved. But this is unlikely. By its very nature, in the Court's
opinion, a purchase of services gives rise to administrative entanglements
and political divisiveness.
Balancing
Without calling its analysis a balancing approach, the Court used a
balancing technique in Lemon, DiCenso, and Tilton. In Lemon, the
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Court balanced those factors in the aid program which benefited the
public against those which aided religion before concluding that the
aid to religion was too great. However, in Tilton, a similar balancing
test produced an opposite result.
This approach suffers from several shortcomings discussed above.
-As Justice White remarked, it is inexplicable why the Tilton program
was upheld while the Lemon aid was not. Whether a particular aid
statute is permissible under this approach is usually unpredictable. Of
course, books and buses are allowed while salary supplements are not,
but it is uncertain whether other forms of aid such as tax credits, schol-
arships, and tuition plans are permissible. Since the Court appears de-
sirous of preserving several options, the answers to these questions must
await developing case law.
